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The  paper  explores  the  way  the  work  of  classic  institutionalist  authors  can  inform 
modern  nonprofit  economics.  From  the  perspective  of  Thorstein  Veblen,  nonprofit 
organisation is explained as an institutional consequence of the pecuniary-industrial 
dichotomy. John R. Commons' institutional economics is used to highlight the role of 
nonprofit organisation in eliminating excessive scarcities of vital goods, thus achieving 
a  more  reasonable  standard  of  living  in  a  society.  In  the  theoretical  system  of 
Clarence Ayres, nonprofit organisation is shown to embody a particular stage in the 
progressive  weakening  of  the  institution  of  private  property  in  response  to 
technological imperatives. The paper concludes with discussing nonprofit organisation 
as a conceptual link in reconciling the institutionalist paradigms of instrumental value 
and reasonable value.  
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In  recent  decades,  the  economics  of  nonprofit  organisation  has  become  a  truly 
booming  field.  The  nonprofit  sector,  and  the  associated  institutional  constructs 
referred  to  as  the  third  sector,  voluntary  sector,  and  social  economy,  are  gaining 
increasing recognition from policy-makers, practitioners, and academics. In the UK, 
nonprofit  firms  have  been  recognised  as  “important  agents  in  the  battles  against 
social  exclusion,  poverty  and  environmental  degradation,  and  key  actors  in  the 
creation of social capital and the delivery of public services” (Haugh and Kitson, 2007, 
pg. 990). The growing impact of the nonprofit sector on diverse aspects of social life 
across the world has been matched by significant advances in the nonprofit economics 
literature. Nonprofit organisations have been found to address a variety of market and 
governmental failures (Steinberg, 2006), and to constitute an integral part of healthy 
democratic societies (Anheier, 2009; Clemens, 2006).  
Most of the theoretical work on nonprofit economics has been done in the  traditions 
of neoclassical and new institutional economics (Jegers, 2008; Steinberg, 2006). Both 
traditions adopt a thoroughly individualist outlook and both explain the existence of 
the nonprofit sector in terms of its ability to address market failure. However, even 
within  the  ranks,  the  market  failure  theories  have  been  criticised  for  their  lacking 
account  of  the  so  called  supply-side  determinants  that  accentuate  nonprofit 
organisation as an outlet for altruism, ideological entrepreneurship, and practicing of 
social values (Steinberg, 2006; Hansmann, 1987). In a relatively recent authoritative 
overview of modern nonprofit economics, Steinberg (2006) concedes that a unified 
theoretical  framework,  that  would  clearly  derive  the  motivations  of  nonprofit 
entrepreneurs from those of customers or citizens who seek the correction of market 
and  governmental  failures,  has  yet  to  be  developed.  Put  simply,  current  nonprofit 
economics recognises no effective linkages between the reasons why nonprofit firms 
are needed and the reasons why nonprofit firms are founded and operated.  
This  weakness of market failure  theories  of nonprofit  organisation has  been widely 
recognized in the literature (Hansmann, 1987; Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991; 
Steinberg,  1993,  2004;  Rose-Ackermann,  1996).  Yet,  its  theoretical  significance 
appears to have been seriously underestimated. In fact, the very notion of market 
failure is ultimately attributable to the divergence of motivations of consumers and 
for-profit  entrepreneurs.  Hence,  if  nonprofit  firms  are  to  correct  market  failures 
resulting from the operation of for-profit firms, they must exhibit a better integration 
between  the  motivations  of  those  who  create  them  and  those  who  consume  their 
outputs.  The  lack  of  this  integration  undermines  the  ability  of  nonprofit  firms  to 
compensate for the limitations of the for-profit sector. Put differently, it is not just 
that integrating the demand-side and supply-side justifications is a promising area of 
further  research;  rather,  without  this  integration,  the  whole  set  of  market  failure 
theories of the nonprofit sector suffers from a fundamental deficit of plausibility.  
At the same time, the chasm between the market failure and supply-side arguments 
for  the  nonprofit  sector  disappears  if  analysis  is  done  from  the  more  holistic 
perspective  advocated  by  classical  institutionalism  in  the  tradition  of  Veblen, 
Commons, and Ayres. According to this strand, society is a holistic entity engaged in 
the  evolutionary  process  of  problem-solving,  which  is  basically  about  societal  self-
provisioning with the material means of life (Tool, 2001; Hodgson, 1998; Samuels, 
1995). In this context, the role of nonprofit organisation is to be seen in facilitating 
this  problem-solving  process  by  overcoming  the  “cultural  lag”  implied  in  the 
ceremonial framework of price system embodied in the for-profit sector. Central to the 
operation of the nonprofit sector is the notion of discretionary social control of the   4 
 
 
economy  (e.g.,  Tool,  2001)  and  the  associated  denial  of  any  meaningful 
“automaticity”  of  markets  (Gruchy,  1987).  Discretionary  control  is  a  mechanism  of 
deliberate adjustment of the economy  in order to make it adequately provide for the 
values  of  individuals  and  their  communities  (ibid,  p.  5).  In  the  nonprofit  sector, 
specific examples of social discretion can be most articulately seen in nonprofit firms‟ 
mission statements.  In essence, these statements constitute societal judgments on 
those specific aspects of “cultural lag” that need to be overcome in order to bring the 
economy in better conformity with community values.  
Excessive methodological individualism of modern nonprofit economics has not gone 
unnoticed in the nonprofit literature. Most importantly, Anheier and Salamon (2006, p. 
106) contrast the conventional new institutional economics theories of the nonprofit 
sector with their own “social origins” theory that “emphasizes the embeddedness of 
the  nonprofit  sector  in  the  cultural,  religious,  political,  and  economic  realities  of 
different countries. It thus views decisions about whether to rely on the market, the 
nonprofit sector, or the state for the provision of key services as not simply open to 
choice by individual consumers in an open market… Rather, it views these choices as 
heavily  constrained  by  prior  patterns  of  historical  development  and  by  the  relative 
power  of  various  social  groupings  that  have  significant  stakes  in  the  outcomes  of 
these decisions”.  
The social origins theory comes close to the insight that the rationale for the nonprofit 
sector is ultimately to be sought in the historical societal problem-solving embedded 
in  the  broad  institutional  environment.  Yet,  this  theory  is  centrally  concerned  with 
explaining  the  geographical  variation  in  the  characteristics  of  the  nonprofit  sector, 
rather than with revealing the sector‟s role in the culturally conditioned societal self-
provisioning with the material means of life. This paper will tackle the latter question 
by  analysing  some  of  the  implications  of  the  classical  institutionalist  literature  and 
applying it to the modern theoretical understanding of the nonprofit sector. As already 
mentioned,  an  immediate  consequence  of  adopting  the  classical  institutionalism‟s 
holistic perspective is the dissolution of the chasm between demand-side and supply-
side  justifications  for  the  nonprofit  sector,  since  the  complex  and  multidimensional 
societal  problem-solving  no  longer  needs  to  be  straightjacketed  into  individual 
behaviour  of  nonprofit  entrepreneurs.  However,  there  is  an  additional,  and  fairly 
obvious,  feature  of  classical  institutionalism  that  makes  it  highly  appropriate  for 
explaining  the  societal  meaning  of  the  nonprofit  sector.  This  feature  (and  its  key 
distinction from new institutional economics) is a critical attitude toward markets. In 
the words of Samuels (1995, p. 580), “a principle theme of institutional economics 
has been that the economy is more than the market”.  
Scepticism toward markets permeates most of the work of classical institutionalists 
and  their  modern  followers.  The  Veblenian  dichotomy  explicitly  questions  the 
instrumental  value  of  market-mediated  interstitial  adjustments  in  the  industrial 
system  and  in  the  community  life  process  more  generally;  C.H.Cooley  viewed  the 
market  as  a  real-world  institution  introducing  important  biases  into  the  process  of 
social valuation, rather than serving as a neutral want-registering mechanism; John R. 
Commons, while less sceptical than reformist, emphasised the need to save American 
capitalism  by  making  markets  more  reasonable;  Clarence  Ayres  warned  of  the 
degrading consequences of “price obsession” and regarded the market as a pecuniary 
ceremony often standing in the way of industrial-technological progress. These and 
other  critical  and  profound  reflections  on  the  role  of  markets  in  the  societal  self-
provisioning  process  stand  remarkably  close  to  the  fundamental  idea  of  nonprofit 
economics that the for-profit sector fails, in important respects, to meet expectations 
of  consumers  and  citizens,  thus  calling  for  alternative  institutional  arrangements 
explicitly rejecting the profit motive as the key motivational driver.    5 
 
 
The  institutionalists‟  attitude  toward  markets  is,  however,  a  complex  and 
multidimensional issue that is certainly not reducible to mere opposition for its own 
sake. Rather, at stake here is a nuanced and realistic analysis of real-world markets 
as  expressions  of  a  broader  organisational-institutional  structure  of  society  (Ayres, 
1978). A genuine institutionalist analysis of the nonprofit sector must thus involve an 
exploration of historical and cultural reasons for supplementing the operation of real-
world  markets  with  the  deliberate  social  control  in  the  form  of  multi-stakeholder 
mission-driven organisations. This kind of analysis obviously engenders a host of new 
issues related to the limits of market-centred economic theorising in explaining the 
nonprofit sector.  
One  of  these  issues,  for  example,  is  the  role  of  efficiency  as  the  normative 
benchmark.  Various  new  institutional  economic  models  of  nonprofit  organisation 
sought  to  identify  the  conditions  under  which  it  presents  an  efficient  solution  to 
contracting problems. Yet, many institutionalists find the neoclassical conceptions of 
efficiency and optimality highly dubitable. While many institutionalists are sympathetic 
to  nonprofit  organisation  as  an  institution  dispensing  with  the  primary  role  of 
pecuniary  motivation,  this  sympathy  is  clearly  justified  on  grounds  other  than 
neoclassical efficiency (Adaman and Madra, 2002; Chasse, 1995). Indeed, a genuine 
institutionalist approach would reject the very notion of market failure as an economic 
justification for nonprofit organisation. This,  in fact,  is a claim repeatedly made by 
contemporary non-economist nonprofit scholars who feel that market failure theories 
of nonprofit organisation relegate it to the periphery of an allegedly market-centred 
social reality (cf. Lohmann, 1992). The very term “nonprofit” conveys connotations of 
being abnormal and residual in an otherwise profit-driven economy, just as the term 
“third sector” invites interpretations of “thirdness” in terms of relative unimportance 
(ibid).  
All in all, the theoretical and methodological affinities notwithstanding, the issues of 
nonprofit organisation have largely escaped the attention of modern institutionalists 
(but see Adaman and Madra, 2002; Chasse, 1995; Valentinov, 2009). This is a sad 
omission, as the planning function of “organised social intelligence” is not limited to 
the public and private for-profit sector (Klein, 1984; Galbraith, 1967; Munkirs, 1983), 
but is obviously exercised in the nonprofit sector as well. This paper is aimed at calling 
institutionalists‟ attention to the nonprofit sector by analysing the way a study of the 
institutionalist  classics,  such  as  Thorstein  Veblen,  John  R.  Commons,  and  Clarence 
Ayres,  can  inform  the  modern  theoretical  understanding  of  nonprofit  organisation. 
Toward this end, the following sections explore: the nonprofit economics implications 
of the Veblenian pecuniary-industrial dichotomy; John R. Commons‟ exposition of the 
complex  relationships  between  scarcity,  efficiency,  transactions,  and  reasonable 
value; and the Ayresian conception of pecuniary ceremonies hindering the attainment 
of instrumental value. The paper concludes with an exploration of the unique potential 
of  nonprofit  economics  in  reconciling  the  institutionalist  paradigms  of  instrumental 
value and reasonable value.  
 
2. Thorstein Veblen 
This section discusses Veblen‟s criticisms of the price system that offer insights about 
the  way  in  which  the  for-profit  sector‟s  shortcomings  create  a  niche  for  nonprofit 
organisation.  The  first  subsection  lays  a  general  foundation  for  this  argument  by 
building on the notion of the Veblenian (pecuniary-industrial) dichotomy; the second 
subsection examines some of Veblen‟s explicit statements on nonprofit organisation 




2.1. Pecuniary-industrial dichotomy 
The pecuniary-industrial dichotomy is a major theme in the work of Thorstein Veblen, 
and is indeed, “a basic analytical tool of institutional economics” (Munkirs, 1988, p. 
1035). It occupies a central place in the writings of many institutionalists, and no brief 
discussion can do full justice to this fundamental notion. This subsection highlights the 
specific aspect of the pecuniary-industrial dichotomy that yields potential insights into 
the nature of nonprofit organisation. Arguably, this aspect is related to the  limited 
ability of the for-profit sector (as an institutional embodiment of the price system) to 
enhance the quality of human life.  
More  specifically,  in  the  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise,  Veblen  argues  that  the 
management  of  industrial  affairs  through  pecuniary  transactions  dissociates  “the 
interests  of  those  men  who  exercise  the  discretion  from  the  interests  of  the 
community”  (1958,  p.  20).  Furthermore,  for  the  businessman  “the  vital  point  of 
production is the vendibility of the output, its convertibility into money values, not its 
serviceability for the needs of mankind. A modicum of serviceability, for some purpose 
or other, the output must have if it is to be saleable. But it does not follow that the 
highest serviceability gives the largest gain to the businessman in terms of money” 
(ibid, p. 30). Another implication of the dissociation of the interest of businessmen 
and that of community is found in the tendency of businessmen to “play at cross-
purposes  and  endeavour  to  derange  industry”  (ibid,  p.  23).  In  contrast  to  modern 
constitutional economists indicating the public virtues of competition (e.g., Vanberg, 
1994; Buchanan, 2000), Veblen (1958) views competition as the basic obstacle in the 
way of a better societal self-provisioning with goods and services.  
Thus,  the  pecuniary-industrial  dichotomy  locates  the  key  problem  of  the  for-profit 
sector  in  the  possibility  of  pecuniary  capitalisation  of  both  serviceability  and 
disserviceability to the community at large. A consequence of the pecuniary-industrial 
dichotomy is that no society can fully rely on the price system in meeting its material 
needs. Alternative institutions are necessary, institutions that defy the pecuniary logic 
of  contractual  exchange,  with  the  obvious  example  being  nonprofit  organisations. 
Thus, in terms of the pecuniary-industrial dichotomy, nonprofit organisation achieves 
those industrial outcomes that are unattainable through pecuniary behaviour. Thus, 
from  a  Veblenian  perspective,  a  key  attribute  of  nonprofit  organisation  is  its 
underlying  nonpecuniary  motivation  that  presents  the  basic  mechanism  whereby 
nonprofit firms compensate for the limitations of for-profit firms.  
While  somewhat  akin  to  market  failure  theories,  the  implied  Veblenian  outlook  on 
nonprofit organisation is much more radical. Similarly to Veblen, the market failure 
theories of nonprofit organisation do admit that real-world for-profit firms may fail to 
act in the best interest of consumers (Steinberg, 2006; Hansmann, 1987; Ben-Ner, 
1986;  Weisbrod,  1991).  Yet,  these  theories  uphold  the  neoclassical  notion  of  the 
consummatory state of competitive equilibrium as an adequate embodiment of that 
interest, and this is precisely what the Veblenian outlook denies. The price system is 
radically  constrained  in  its  capacity  to  enhance  human  welfare,  thus  calling  for 
deliberate social control rather than competitive market equilibrium as a means for 
achieving social progress.  
Both  critically  and  affirmatively,  the  pecuniary-industrial  dichotomy  has  been 
recognised as an inherently normative concept rooted in the instrumental theory of 
value.  It  is,  in  essence,  this  theory  of  value  that  leads  institutional  economists  to 
doubt the capacity of the price system (and hence, of the for-profit sector) to enhance 
human  welfare.  More  specifically,  institutional  economists  join  the  pragmatist   7 
 
 
philosophy in believing that values originate from the social problem-solving process, 
rather than from “introspective and subjective recesses of the minds of hypothetically 
rational  individuals”  (Gruchy,  1987,  p.  63).  Accordingly,  values  are  held  to  be 
historical,  socially  and  culturally  conditioned,  emergent,  and  subject  to  continuous 
reappraisal.  According  to  Gruchy,  “what  is  deemed  to  be  valuable  in  the  valuation 
process is the item, product, or cultural situation that enables the individual to reduce 
conflict or tension so that he or she may realise his or her full potential for personal 
development  more  effectively  and  may  also  contribute  more  effectively  to  the 
enlargement of community welfare” (ibid, p. 65). In this vein, Marc Tool‟s (2001, p. 
293) social value criterion emphasises “the continuity and instrumental efficiency of 
re-creating community non-invidiously”. 
It is noteworthy that the neoclassical utility theory of value centred around optimal 
resource  allocation  has  been  developed  to  explain  the  operation  of  the  for-profit 
sector. As mentioned above, institutional economists dispense with this kind of value 
theory; yet, the presumptive plausibility of this theory is at its maximum when it is 
applied to the for-profit sector. Conversely, this theory‟s limitations are particularly 
obvious in the case of the nonprofit sector. In particular, the instrumental theory of 
value  contains  two  non-utilitarian  postulates  that  are  crucial  for  understanding  the 
rationale  of  the  nonprofit  sector:  1)  values  are  rooted  in  society  rather  than  in 
individual  introspection;  and  2)  values  are  continually  reassessed  in  the  course  of 
ongoing social problem-solving. Indeed, the decision to create a nonprofit firm reflects 
a proactive attitude that is difficult to reconcile with the hedonistic view of economic 
actors  as  passively  responding  to  the  external  stimuli  of  pleasure  and  pain. 
Furthermore, certain needs must be deemed as sufficiently important to warrant the 
creation of a nonprofit firm, while the utilitarian view of needs (or wants) as primary 
exogenous data precludes their critical examination. Finally, nonprofit firms‟ missions 
(that reflect the above needs) are obviously conditioned by the institutional, social, 
and cultural environment of particular societies, and arise from specific problems of 
these societies, rather than from a historical subjective introspection. Thus, from a 
Veblenian perspective, the role of nonprofit organisation as a nonpecuniary institution 
is seen in historically and culturally shaped societal problem-solving, and specifically 
that kind of problem-solving that fails to be attained by the price system.  
 
2.2. Specific theses on nonprofit organisation 
In The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen (1994, p. 205) states that “the pecuniary 
or the leisure-class culture … is in its latest development beginning to neutralize its 
own ground, by eliminating the habit of invidious comparison in respect of efficiency, 
or even of pecuniary standing… That is to say, in the latest and fullest development of 
the institution [i.e., leisure class], the livelihood of members of this class does not 
depend  on  the  possession  and  the  unremitting  exercise  of  those  aptitudes  which 
characterize the successful predatory man”. Thus, one of the chapters of this book is 
entitled Survivals of the Non-Invidious Interest, and it is in this chapter that one finds 
Veblen‟s highly suggestive and incisive comments on nonprofit organisation. The title 
of that chapter, in fact, serves well as the base-line summary of these comments, viz. 
that  nonprofit  organisation  constitutes  a  sort  of  residue  of  non-emulative 
nonpecuniary behaviour in an otherwise pecuniary society.  
Veblen exemplifies this argument as follows: “So, for instance, the greater number of 
men who have to do with industry in the way of pecuniarily managing an enterprise 
take  some  interest  and  some  pride  in  seeing  that  the  work  is  well-done  and  is 
industrially effective, and this even apart from the profit which may result from any 
improvement  of  this  kind.  The  efforts  of  commercial  clubs  and  manufacturers‟   8 
 
 
organisations in this direction of non-invidious advancement of industrial efficiency are 
also well known” (ibid, p. 207). Furthermore, according to Veblen, similar rejection of 
pecuniary  emulative  behaviour  is  characteristic  of  organisations,  “the  purpose  of 
which is some work of charity and of social amelioration… Such, for instance, are the 
agitation for temperance and similar social reforms, for prison reform, for the spread 
of education, for the suppression of vice, and for the avoidance of war by arbitration, 
disarmament,  or other means;  such  are,  in some  measure,  university  settlements, 
neighborhood guilds, the various organisations typified by the Young Men‟s Christian 
Association  and  the  Young  People‟s  Society  for  Christian  Endeavor,  sewing  circles, 
social  clubs,  art  clubs,  and  even  commercial  clubs;  such  are  also,  in  some  slight 
measure,  the  pecuniary  foundations  of  semi-public  establishments  for  charity, 
education,  or amusement,  whether they  are  endowed by  wealthy  individuals  or by 
contributions  collected  from  persons  of  smaller  means  –  in  so  far  as  these 
establishments are not of a religious character” (ibid). 
Veblen‟s view of nonprofit organisation bears the full imprint of his overall pessimism. 
In  The  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise,  he  argues  that  nonpecuniary  behaviour 
embodied  in nonprofit  organisation serves  the  purpose  of alleviating  the  degrading 
cultural  consequences  of  what  he  calls  “the  natural  decay  of  business  enterprise”. 
“Something  must  be  done,  it  is  conceived,  and  this  something  takes  the  shape  of 
charity organizations, clubs and societies for social „purity‟, for amusement, education, 
and  manual  training  of  the  indigent  classes,  for  colonization  of  the  poor,  for 
popularization of churches, for clean politics, for cultural missionary work by social 
settlements, and the like. These remedial measures whereby it is proposed to save or 
to rehabilitate certain praiseworthy but obsolescent habits of life and of thought are, 
all and several, beside the point so far as touches the question in hand” (Veblen 1958, 
p. 179). According to Veblen, the futility of these nonprofit activities follows from their 
not “falling into the shape of a business proposition” (ibid) and being dependent “on 
the vagaries of personal preference, tastes, and prejudices” (ibid, p. 180).  
Thus,  Veblen‟s  main  critical  concern  with  nonprofit  organisation  seems  to  be  its 
pervasive  dependence  on  the  arbitrary  will  (and  inadvertent  impulses  of 
workmanship)  of  members  of  the  upper  class.  While  he  appreciated  the  ultimate 
instrumental  value  of  tackling  the  social  problems  he  mentions  in  reference  to 
nonprofit  organisation,  he  questioned  the  ability  of  the  upper  class  to  do  so 
effectively, primarily in light of the inherently predatory and ceremonial culture that is 
constitutive  of  that  class.  For  one,  the  pressure  of  devout  observances,  generally 
characteristic  of  the  upper  class,  potentially  undermines  the  instrumental  role  of 
nonprofit organisation. Writing about the combination of the devotional and secular 
well-being  of  nonprofit  organisation  beneficiaries,  he  was  concerned  that  the 
concentration of effort on the devotional well-being impairs the chances of achieving 
secular well-being (which is the truly instrumental one) (Veblen 1994, p. 209-210). 
Furthermore,  the  ideological  framework  of  particular  nonprofit  firms  may  involve 
inculcation  to  the  beneficiaries  “by  precept  and  example,  of  certain  punctilios  of 
upper-class  propriety  in  manners  and  customs.  The  economic  substance  of  these 
proprieties will commonly be found on scrutiny to be a conspicuous waste of time and 
goods” (ibid, p. 210).  
Truly satiric are Veblen‟s comments about the posthumous type of conspicuous waste, 
as exemplified in the administration of bequests of wealthy and public-spirited men 
(whose sincerity Veblen was even prepared to take for granted). “Certain funds, for 
instance, may have been set apart as a foundation for a foundling asylum or a retreat 
for  invalids.  The  diversion  of  expenditure  to  honorific  waste  in  such  cases  is  not 
uncommon enough to cause surprise or even to raise a smile. An appreciable share of 
the  funds  is  spent  in  the  construction  of  an  edifice  faced  with  some  aesthetically   9 
 
 
objectionable but expensive stone, covered with grotesque and incongruous details, 
and designed … to suggest certain barbaric methods of warfare. The interior of the 
structure shows the same pervasive guidance of the canons of conspicuous waste and 
predatory exploit” (ibid, p. 213). Later on, Veblen suggests that neither the donor nor 
the beneficiaries are likely to find fault with the described way of administration of 
funds, their obvious waste notwithstanding.  
Veblen‟s specific theses on nonprofit organisation, as highlighted in this subsection, 
clearly  anticipate  some  of  the  modern  theoretical  developments  in  this  field.  In 
particular, his pessimism about the nonprofit sector and his concern with its upper 
class  domination  are  to  an  important  extent  paralleled  by  the  “voluntary  failure” 
theory of Lester Salamon (1987). Salamon argues that nonprofit firms have several 
inherent shortcomings preventing them from delivering their  missions. The primary 
voluntary failure is philanthropic insufficiency, i.e., “inability to generate resources on 
a scale that is both adequate enough and reliable enough to cope with the human 
service  problems”  (ibid,  p.  111).  Others  include  philanthropic  particularism, 
philanthropic paternalism, and philanthropic amateurism. All of these shortcomings, 
while constraining the ability of nonprofits to address the underlying social ills, are 
associated with upper class philanthropy.  
Another  important  modern  conception  is  the  ideological  entrepreneurship  theory  of 
nonprofit organisation as presented in the work of Estelle James (1987), Susan Rose-
Ackerman (1996), and Dennis Young (1983). A fundamental idea of this literature is 
that  nonprofit  firms  are  often  created  and  operated  by  mission-driven  and 
ideologically-oriented  individuals  deriving  satisfaction  from  living  up  to  their 
ideological convictions. Veblen‟s analysis of nonprofit organisation not only anticipates 
this idea, but also introduces the fundamental criticism that the ideological orientation 
may stand in the way of nonprofit firms‟ instrumental efficiency (i.e. their ability to 
realise  instrumental  value).  While  admitting  that  controlling  the  behaviour  of 
ideological entrepreneurs may present a challenge to various nonprofit constituencies, 
the modern literature stops short of exploring the latter criticism.  
Yet, the pessimism about the long-term instrumental efficiency of the nonprofit sector 
did not prevent Veblen from believing in this sector‟s unique feature of at least partial 
elimination  of  the  pecuniary  motive.  Veblen  was  fully  aware  that  organisations 
pursuing  the  purposes  of  charity  and  social  amelioration  are  often  “initiated  and 
carried on with a view primarily to the enhanced repute, or even to the pecuniary 
gain,  of  their  promoters”  (Veblen,  1994,  p.  208).  At  the  same  time,  according  to 
Veblen,  “after  all  allowances  and  deductions  have  been  made,  there  is  left  some 
remainder  of  motives  of  a  non-emulative  kind.  The  fact  itself  that  distinction  or  a 
decent good fame is sought by this method is evidence of a prevalent sense of the 
legitimacy,  and  of  the  presumptive  effectual  presence,  of  a  non-emulative,  non-
invidious  interest,  as  a  constituent  factor  in  the  habits  of  thought  of  modern 
communities” (ibid). Thus, in Veblen‟s view, nonprofit organisation is a consequence 
of  pecuniary-industrial  dichotomy,  and  seeks  to  attain  instrumental  value  that  is 
unattainable through pecuniary behaviour. Yet, nonprofit organisation is too weak to 
fully realise this purpose and thus to save capitalism. On the latter point, an opposite 
view was entertained by John R. Commons, to whom we now turn.  
 
3. John R. Commons 
This section brings together several threads of John R. Commons' multifaceted theory 
in order to construct an explanation of nonprofit organisation. The first thread is given 
by Commons' theory of transactions and  the related discussion of the principles of   10 
 
 
scarcity and efficiency; the second thread is his theory of reasonable value. These are 
discussed in the first two respective subsections. The last subsection combines these 
threads in order to draw theoretical implications for nonprofit organisation.  
 
3.1. Scarcity, efficiency, and transactions 
A basic commonality between the institutional economics of John R. Commons and the 
mainstream  neoclassical  theory  is  the  central  importance  of  scarcity.  Commons, 
however, treats this notion in a way much different from that of orthodox economics. 
According to him, “institutional economics openly avows scarcity, instead of taking it 
for granted, and gives to collective action its proper place of deciding conflicts and 
maintaining order in a world of scarcity, private property, and the resulting conflicts” 
(2005,  pg.  6).  Thus,  scarcity  causes  conflicts,  the  resolution  of  which  requires 
collective  action  in  the  form  of  going  concerns  structured  by  working  rules.  While 
recognising the allocational role of scarcity, Commons explained wealth generation in 
terms of another universal principle he termed “efficiency”, which “overcomes scarcity 
by cooperation” (ibid).  
The  relationship  between  the  principles  of  scarcity  and  efficiency  is  a  multifaceted 
theme  whose  explicit  discussion  occupies  more  than  one  hundred  pages  of 
Institutional Economics. Commons treats these principles as the basic two dimensions 
of economic value, neither of which is more important than the other. “By efficiency is 
meant … the rate of output per unit of input, the man-hour, thus increasing the power 
over  nature…  By  scarcity  is  meant  …  the  rate  of  proprietary  income  from  other 
persons relative to the rate of proprietary outgo, measured by the dollar” (Commons, 
2005,  p.  259,  emphasis  in  original).  Crucially,  efficiency  is  associated  with  the 
“engineering concept of wealth” understood as production regardless of prices, while 
scarcity underlies the formation of prices as scarcity-values which are necessary in 
order to allocate productive resources. “So far as the engineer is merely an engineer, 
not under the businessman‟s orders, he goes on producing indefinitely. Today, he has 
become surprised that the world‟s business organization will not permit him to use his 
abilities for the good of mankind” (ibid, p. 256).  
According  to  Commons,  a  clear  differentiation  between  these  two  principles  is  an 
important achievement of his theory of institutional economics. Indeed, without their 
difference being made clear, one has to assume that “restricting output is a service 
and increasing output is a service. Increasing the scarcity of goods is a service, and 
increasing  the  abundance  of  goods  is  a  service”  (ibid,  p.  257).  By  distinguishing 
between scarcity and efficiency, Commons is able to explain the way “in which private 
ownership renders a service to society. It is not by production, but by the regulation 
of production… If the farmer finds that the price of wheat is falling, but the price of 
hogs  is  rising,  he  turns  his  labor-power  from  wheat  to  hogs.  He  supplies  a  more 
intense demand by producing hogs, and a lesser demand by producing wheat. This is 
indeed a service to society, if it is well done” (ibid, pp. 257-258, emphasis in original). 
The fundamental importance of both scarcity and efficiency leads Commons to define 
capitalism as “the double process of creating use-value for others and restricting its 
supply so as to create scarcity-value” (ibid, p. 284).  
Commons  associates  the  principles  of  scarcity  and  efficiency  with  bargaining  and 
managerial transactions, respectively. “Bargaining transactions transfer ownership of 
wealth by voluntary agreement between legal equals. Managerial transactions create 
wealth by commands of legal superiors” (ibid, p. 68). In this way, scarcity underlies 
the notions of property and assets, while efficiency engenders the notion of wealth. 
Operating through bargaining and managerial transactions, the relationship of scarcity   11 
 
 
and efficiency poses the institutional problem of the sharing of the available wealth 
and the “inducements to keep the concern agoing” (ibid, p. 256). It is in this problem 
of sharing that ethical considerations, implied in the transactions, come to the fore 
and  are  explicitly  analysed  by  Commons  in  his  theory  of  reasonable  value  and 
rationing transactions.  
 
3.2. Reasonable value 
Ramstad (2001, p. 263) argues that a key to understanding the Commons theory of 
reasonable value is Commons‟ conception of correlation of economics, ethics, and law 
in the transaction. The ethical component of the transaction primarily refers to the 
extent  to  which  the  transaction  is  reasonable.  In  general  terms,  the  problem  of 
reasonable value is concerned with the issue of “whether one is giving up a larger 
share, and the other is therefore receiving a larger share of the social output than is 
„reasonable‟” (Commons, 2005, p. 333). This formulation of the value problem is “a 
radical departure from the usual procedure in economic theory. Instead of individual 
valuation, we have social valuation. Instead of a theory of valuation at the limit of 
perfect competition, we have valuations in the zone of private power” (Parsons, 1970, 
p. 362). The reasonable value problem is evidently implied in Commons‟ definition of 
political economy as the “proportioning of inducements, by means of working rules, to 
individuals  and  associations” (Commons,  1924,  p.  387). It  is  thus natural  that the 
relationship  between  scarcity  and  efficiency  also  falls  within  the  purview  of  the 
reasonable value theory (cf. Commons, 2005, p. 387).  
This theory has been widely, and controversially, discussed in the secondary literature 
on Commons, particularly by contrasting it with the instrumental theory of value (e.g., 
Ramstad 1989, 2001; Atkinson and Reed, 1990). Commons (1970, p. 25) argues that 
“reasonableness  is  best  ascertained  in  practice  when  representatives  of  conflicting 
organized economic interests, instead of politicians or lawyers, agree voluntarily on 
the working rules of their collective action in control of individual action”. Therefore, 
reasonableness can also be conceptualised as relating to the reasonableness limits of 
coercion  in  bargaining  transactions  (Commons,  2005,  p.  331).  For  Commons,  the 
starting point for examining reasonable value is the deviation of free competition from 
fair competition (ibid, p. 333). In the courts, reasonable value is determined “by the 
social method of ascertaining objectively what is customary, dominant, and therefore 
reasonable” (ibid, p. 340).  
Of  particular  interest  are  Commons‟  specific  suggestions  on  how  bargaining 
transactions  can  be  made  reasonable  through  concerted  action  in  the  form  of 
corporation and regulation. “In the corporate form the individuals authorize a board of 
directors and a manager to make the bargains which legally bind the share-holders. 
Individual  bargaining  is  eliminated.  But  in  the  regulative  method  the  participants, 
whether  individuals  or  corporations,  yield  to  the  rules,  laws,  or  regulations  which 
determine  limits  upon  their  individual  or  corporate  bargaining  power.  Individual 
bargaining  continues,  but  is  limited”  (ibid,  p.  342).  Here,  Commons  is  importantly 
prefiguring  Williamson‟s  analysis  of  the  transaction  cost-economising  role  of 
corporation as contrasted with arms-length market contracting (cf. Kaufman, 2007). 
However, and in contrast with the new institutional economics perspective, Commons 
explains both corporation and regulation in terms of the ethical purpose of reducing 
economic  coercion  that  would  be  induced  by  unrestrained  bargaining  transactions. 
Furthermore,  both  the  corporate  and  regulative  methods  of  concerted  action  are 
realised  through  rationing  transactions,  a  transaction  variety  that  is  absent  in  the 
market-hierarchy framework of transaction cost economics.    12 
 
 
The potential fruitfulness of the theory of reasonable value for explaining nonprofit 
organisation can be glimpsed in Commons‟ distinction between two types of standards 
of  reasonableness:  standards  of  transactions  and  standards  of  living.  “The  former 
relate  to  managerial,  bargaining,  and  rationing  transactions  in  the  production, 
marketing, and distributing of wealth. The latter are Standards of Consumption” (ibid, 
p. 701). The difference between these two standards of reasonableness seems to be 
that the former are primarily related to the business economy, while the latter reflect 
broader  societal  concerns  over  quality  of  life.  Obviously,  in  Commons‟  work,  the 
theory  of  reasonable  value  is  much  more  centrally  concerned  with  standards  of 
transactions than with the standards of living. Yet, it is no less obvious that the issue 
of  reasonableness,  when  raised  in  respect  to  the  overall  quality  of  life,  is  no  less 
important than when it is posed in order to judge the fairness of business bargaining. 
Evidently, securing a reasonable standard of living, similarly to securing a reasonable 
standard of transactions, requires “concerted economic action” in the form of rationing 
transactions. As the next subsection argues, nonprofit organisation embodies a form 
of rationing transactions aimed at achieving the former standard.  
 
3.3. Implications for nonprofit organisation 
While Commons recognised the potentially destructive effects of pecuniary incentives 
on  industrial  performance  (e.g.,  in  differentiating  between  efficiency  profits  and 
scarcity profits), he did not uphold the radical Veblenian approach to the pecuniary-
industrial  dichotomy.  Instead,  Commons  believed  that  the  pecuniary  and  industrial 
behaviour, exemplified in the principles of scarcity and efficiency, could be harmonised 
in a reasonable relationship between these principles. As Atkinson and Reed (1990, p. 
1097) argue, this harmonisation becomes possible through the use of “the concept of 
the  transaction  to  make  the  distinction  between  the  two  types  of  behavior”.  More 
specifically,  scarcity  and  efficiency  can  be  made  reasonable  through  rationing 
transactions.  As  discussed  above,  the  main  rationing  transactions  that  make  the 
business economy reasonable include corporation and regulation; and in reference to 
the societal concerns over quality of life, a relevant rationing transaction is evidently 
embodied  in  the  operation  of  nonprofit  organisation.  As  nonprofit  firms  are 
multistakeholder organisations that mobilise resources for addressing urgent societal 
concerns, they embody collective action reapportioning burdens and inducements in 
order  to  bring  the  relevant  going  concerns  in  better  conformity  with  the  evolving 
societal purposes.  
The  unreasonable  relationship  between  scarcity  and  efficiency,  implied  in  the 
Veblenian pecuniary-industrial dichotomy, evidently consists in the unreasonably large 
element  of  scarcity.  Consequently,  making  this  relationship  reasonable  calls  for  a 
diminished  role  of  scarcity,  and  this  is  arguably  what  the  involved  rationing 
transactions  achieve.  This  argument  has  direct  implications  for  understanding  the 
property  rights  structure  of  nonprofit  organisation.  Commons  (1990,  p.  260) 
insightfully  remarks  that  property  is  “the  volitional  equivalent  of  scarcity”. 
Accordingly, the diminished role of scarcity in the involved rationing transactions calls 
for  the  diminished  role  of  property,  and  this  is  precisely  what  is  implied  by  the 
preclusion of effective ownership through the nondistribution constraint of nonprofit 
organisation.  Moreover,  the  diminished  role  of  property  is  also  observable  as  an 
outcome  of  those  rationing  transactions  that  achieve  the  reasonable  relationship 
between  scarcity  and  efficiency  within  business  economy.  In  the  new  institutional 
economics literature, this diminished role of property is traditionally referred to as the 
attenuation  of  property  rights  and  is  criticised  for  its  inefficiency  (Furubotn  and 
Pejovich,  1973;  Alchian and  Demsetz,  1972). Arguably,  the  classical  institutionalist   13 
 
 
perspective  on  the  attenuation  of  property  rights  can  be  well  exemplified  by 
contrasting the concept of the nondistribution constraint with Commons' definition of 
institution  as  “collective  action  in  control,  liberation,  and  expansion  of  individual 
action”.  This  perspective  certainly  takes  into  account  that  the  nondistribution 
constraint controls (i.e., constrains) the action of those individuals whose behaviour is 
directly affected by the nondistribution constraint; but it also invites exploration of the 
ways in which the nondistribution constraint helps to liberate and expand the action of 
a  whole  set  of  other  stakeholders  who  benefit  from  the  nonprofit  organisation 
activities. The  new  institutional  economics  framework  of attenuated  property  rights 
fails to pay attention to these ways.  
Another  implication  of  the  proposed  argument  is  the  existence  of  the  important 
commonality between nonprofit organisation, for-profit corporation, and regulation. All 
of  these  can  be  seen  as  rationing  transactions  aimed  at  restoring  the  reasonable 
relationship between scarcity and efficiency. It is therefore inappropriate to postulate 
a conceptual chasm between the nonprofit, public, and private for-profit sector, since 
all  of these  present  the  instances  of collective  action that  in  various  ways  control, 
liberate, and expand individual behaviour. At the same time, the distinction between 
for-profit and nonprofit firms does not disappear. It can be discerned in the different 
role assigned by these firms to scarcity, as reflected in the difference in the way these 
firms'  goals  are  defined.  Not  surprisingly,  corporation  and  regulation  as  rationing 
transactions  within  the  business  economy  do  not  radically  challenge  scarcity,  but 
rather  redefine  it  with  a  view  toward  making  it  more  reasonable.  Accordingly, 
corporations and regulated firms, while behaving more reasonably than in the absence 
of  the  involved  rationing  transactions,  are  still  profit-driven  and  thus  necessarily 
interested in maintaining definite (reasonable) scarcity relations. In contrast, nonprofit 
organisation referring not to the business economy but to the overall quality of life, 
does  involve  a  more  radical  questioning  of  scarcity  that  may  exercise  a  beneficial 
regulating effect on the former, but not on the latter. Accordingly, the organisational 
goals of nonprofit firms are fundamentally defined not in terms of profit, but in terms 
of achievement of substantive missions. The latter organisational goals are obviously 
defined  in  terms  of  efficiency,  rather  than  scarcity.  Thus,  while  corporation  and 
regulation achieve a more reasonable relationship between scarcity and efficiency by 
modifying the existing scarcity patterns, nonprofit organisation embodies a conscious 
substitution  of  scarcity  for  efficiency  in  apportioning  resources  for  resolving  vital 
societal issues. This is arguably what is ultimately implied by the substitution of profit-
related goals by mission-related goals.  
 
4. Clarence Ayres 
This  section explores  the  potential  contribution of Clarence  Ayres  to explaining  the 
role of nonprofit organisation in modern market economies. The theoretical system of 
Clarence  Ayres  centrally  builds  upon  the  Veblenian  pecuniary-industrial  dichotomy. 
Indeed,  according  to  Ayres  (1978,  p.  xiv),  “two  forces  seem  to  be  present  in  all 
human  behaviour  in  all  ages:  one  progressive,  dynamic,  productive  of  cumulative 
change;  the  other  counter-progressive,  static,  inhibitory  of  change”.  Following  the 
Veblenian  tradition,  Ayres  respectively  designates  these  forces  as  technology  and 
ceremonialism, with the phenomena of prices and private ownership being important 
examples  of  the  latter  (ibid).  Even  though  the  Ayresian  technological-ceremonial 
dichotomy  has  invited  some  criticism  from  other  institutionalists  (e.g.,  Hodgson, 
2004), it has enabled him to develop valuable technological interpretations of value 
and progress (e.g., Mayhew, 2010). Central to Ayresian understanding of value is the 
rejection of neoclassical equivalence between value and price: “prices do not measure   14 
 
 
real values but only quantify the judgments people make antecedent to their price 
transactions. Whether those judgments are wise or foolish is determined not by the 
pricing mechanism but by their relation to the technological life-stream” (Ayres, 1978, 
p. 227). The Ayresian interpretation of progress, while complex and multifaceted, can 
arguably  be  well  exemplified  by  his  reference  to  the  “significant  and  far-reaching 
displacement  of  ceremonial  by  technological  functions  throughout  society”  (ibid,  p. 
200).  It  is  this  “displacement  of  ceremonial  by  technological  functions”  that  yields 
insights about the role of nonprofit organisation. 
More specifically, this displacement is manifested in the progressive weakening “of all 
institutional  ties  and  sanctions”,  including  the  institution  of  ownership,  in  modern 
Western  society  (ibid,  p.  185). According  to Ayres, this  is  required by  the  logic  of 
progressive technological development. Among many examples of the weakening of 
the institution of ownership, Ayres discusses the separation of ownership and control 
in  large  industrial  corporations.  “So  great  has  been  the  proliferation  of  technical 
instruments  and  skills  in  modern  business  that  „management‟  has  come  to  play  a 
constantly increasing part in its conduct, and „ownership‟ a correspondingly decreasing 
part” (ibid, p. 199). Obviously, Ayresian interpretation of separation of ownership and 
control in terms of the “displacement of ceremonial by technological functions” stands 
in  stark  contrast  to  its  new  institutional  economics  interpretation  in  terms  of 
attenuation of property rights. At the same time, as stated in the preceding section, 
attenuated  property  rights  structures  underlie  not  only  for-profit  corporations  and 
public  utilities, but  also  nonprofit firms.  Accordingly,  from  an  Ayresian perspective, 
nonprofit  organisation  can  be  seen  as  a  particular  instance  of  the  progressive 
weakening  of  the  institution  of  ownership  in  the  overarching  process  of  the 
“displacement of ceremonial by technological functions”.  
While Ayres does not tackle the issue of nonprofit organisation, he makes a number of 
insightful  comments,  the  significance  of  which  for  nonprofit  organisation  becomes 
obvious if seen in the context of the above suggested perspective. He emphasises that 
the institutions of the state and property are essentially divisive and thus necessarily 
retain organisational structures that are too constrained and too small-scale to match 
the “universal pervasiveness of technology” (ibid, p. 291). Nonprofit organisation can 
be  accordingly  seen as  an institutional  instrument  for overcoming  the  divisiveness, 
implicit in private profit-seeking, in order to address those societal challenges whose 
“universal pervasiveness” precludes an effective solution through markets and states. 
Given  his  argument  about  the  divergence  between  price  values  and  technological 
values and his related criticism of “profit-motivated non-production” (ibid, p. 304), it 
is easy to explain the rationale of nonprofit organisation in terms of its challenging the 
price  values  and  directly  producing  those  technological  values  that  would  not  be 
produced in the profit-driven price system. More generally, the Ayresian perspective 
on nonprofit organisation locates its role in effecting an adjustment of institutions to 
technology,  and  thus  overcoming  a  particular  cultural  lag,  and  certainly  not  in 
addressing  market  failure.  From  the  Ayresian  perspective,  the  evolutionary  role  of 
nonprofit organisation is to contribute to the development of what Ayres (1961) calls 
“the reasonable society”, i.e., society governed not by ceremonial values of the price 
system, but by technological, or true, values. At the same time, given the open-ended 
character of Ayresian economics, nonprofit organisation must be seen as a particular 
evolutionary form of the progressive weakening of the institution of ownership.  Its 
specific  role  can  be  understood  only  in  the  context  of  the  real-world  patterns  of 
historical evolution of human societies.  
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5. Nonprofit organisation, instrumental value, and reasonable value 
The  preceding  sections  of  this  paper  have  located  the  rationale  for  nonprofit 
organisation  in  attaining  both  instrumental  and  reasonable  value.  The  instrumental 
value  argument,  based  on  the  work  of  Veblen  and  Ayres,  holds  that  nonprofit 
organisation provides a means of enhancing community welfare beyond the capacity 
of  the  essentially  ceremonial  price  system.  The  economic  philosophy  of  nonprofit 
organisation is seen in challenging the societal relevance of pecuniary valuation, and 
thus in solving those societal problems that are either left unattended by the for-profit 
sector or arise from its very operation. In contrast, the reasonable value argument, 
derived  from  John  R.  Commons'  institutional  economics,  does  not  involve  a 
dichotomisation of values into ceremonial (pecuniary) and technological (industrial). 
Rather,  it  locates  the  role  of  nonprofit  organisation  in  restoring  a  reasonable 
relationship  between  scarcity  and  efficiency  in  respect  to  what  is  deemed  as  a 
societally acceptable quality of life. Nonprofit organisation thus emerges as a means of 
attaining a reasonable socio-economic condition of society by reconciling conflicting 
values rather than by asserting the superiority of some values over others. Obviously, 
explaining  nonprofit  organisation  in  terms  of  instrumental  and  reasonable  value 
involves  quite distinct lines  of argumentation.  It  is  therefore  worthwhile  to explore 
how nonprofit organisation manages to realise this twofold task.  
First of all,  it  must  be  noted that the  relationship  between instrumental  value  and 
reasonable  value  has  been  controversially  discussed  in  the  institutional  economics 
literature.  According  to  Ramstad  (1989),  instrumental  value  and  reasonable  value 
constitute competing and mutually inconsistent paradigms, as might be inferred from 
Commons' rejection of the Veblenian dichotomy because of its failure to incorporate 
reasonable value. Among others, Atkinson and Reed (1990, p. 1100) take exception 
to this view by arguing that “instrumentally efficient institutional adjustment must be 
reasonable;  that  is,  it  must  be  negotiated  among  the  participants  in  a  situation”. 
Indeed,  it  is  evident  that  the  Ayresian  instrumental  process  of  “displacement  of 
ceremonial by technological functions” can meaningfully proceed just as far as it is 
reasonable;  what  would  be  unreasonable,  with  respect  to  this  process,  is  both 
excessive cultural lag and excessive displacement of ceremonies that is not warranted 
by  the  actual  technological  development.  Both  instrumental  and  reasonable  values 
must thus be seen as crucially interconnected. Accordingly, social progress requires 
not only the attainment of each of these, but also the operation of a linkage between 
them, and it is here that nonprofit organisation assumes a special role.  
More specifically, according to the instrumental value argument, nonprofit firms seek 
the  realisation  of  instrumental  value  that  is  neglected  by  the  system  of  pecuniary 
valuation.  An  obvious  fact  about  this  value  is  that  its  realisation  requires  the 
expenditure of resources that must be apportioned for that purpose through a specific 
decision-making  mechanism  (rationing  transaction).  Within the  sphere  of pecuniary 
valuation, the problem of resource allocation is solved through the price mechanism, 
yet it is the essence of the pecuniary-industrial dichotomy that this mechanism does 
not (sufficiently) accommodate instrumental values; hence it can provide no guidance 
in  apportioning  resources  for  its  attainment.  On  what  basis,  then,  should  societal 
resources be apportioned for attaining instrumental value? 
Arguably, the sought-for basis is given by considerations of reasonableness. As the 
price  mechanism  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  enable  the  sufficient  attainment  of 
instrumental  value  embodied  in  health  care,  social  services,  arts,  education, 
community development, and other areas, resources must be apportioned to these 
areas  depending  upon  what  extent  of  their  development  is  considered  reasonable. 
This understanding of reasonableness is, in fact, a logical continuation of the above   16 
 
 
mentioned  John  R.  Commons  argument  that  bargaining  transactions  can  be  made 
more  reasonable  when  supplemented  by  rationing  transactions  in  the  form  of 
corporation and regulation. In this vein, with respect to standards of living rather than 
to standards of transactions, reasonableness is similarly achieved through rationing 
transactions in the form of nonprofit organisation. Nonprofit firms effect a reasonable 
proportioning  of  resources  among  distinct  instrumental  values  by  inducing  their 
stakeholders to make decisions regarding voluntary resource contributions in the form 
of  donations,  volunteering,  and  working  for  a  lower  wage  than  could  be  earned 
elsewhere.  Whereas  different  nonprofit  firms  seek  to  realise  different  types  of 
instrumental value, their stakeholders, through their continuous decision-making on 
voluntary  resource  contributions,  effect  a  reasonable  proportioning  of resources  for 
the  instrumental  values  in  question.  Thus,  nonprofit  organisation  does  not  merely 
provide an example of conceptual reconciliation between instrumental and reasonable 
value paradigms; it constitutes a practical institutional mechanism for effecting this 
reconciliation.  
 
6. Concluding comments 
This paper argues that the modern multidisciplinary research on nonprofit economics 
can be informed by the classical institutionalist perspective in several crucial respects. 
From Veblenian economics, it can appreciate the role of nonprofit organisation as an 
institutional response to the pecuniary-industrial dichotomy,  i.e., as an institutional 
outlet  for  nonpecuniary  pursuits  of  workmanship  that  seek  to  realise  industrial-
technological  value.  From  the  institutional  economics  of  John  R.  Commons,  it  can 
discern how nonprofit organisation eliminates excessive artificial scarcities and thus 
enables a society to achieve a more reasonable standard of living for its members. 
From the theoretical legacy of Clarence Ayres, it can benefit by recognising the special 
position  of  nonprofit  organisation  in  the  progressive  process  of  “displacement  of 
ceremonial by technological functions” and the associated weakening of the institution 
of  private  property  as  embodied,  among  other  things,  in  the  nondistribution 
constraint.  All  of  these  insights  clearly  differ  from  the  new  institutional  economics 
approach  of  explaining  nonprofit  organisation  in  terms  of  how  it  addresses  market 
failures. While the classical  institutionalist perspective does not deny that nonprofit 
organisation may do so in specific historical and cultural contexts, it does not believe 
that the market failure argument constitutes the whole truth about this institutional 
arrangement.  
The  classical  institutionalist  perspective  potentially  gives  rise  to  a  new  research 
paradigm on nonprofit economics. First of all, the analysis of classical institutionalist 
insights  on  nonprofit  organisation  in  this  paper  is  by  no  means  exhaustive;  there 
exists significant potential for extending the proposed argument from the perspective 
of  classical  and  modern  authors  in  the  institutionalist  tradition.  An  overarching 
characteristic of institutionalist research on nonprofit organisation is a critical attitude 
toward the existing institutional structure (cf. Samuels, 1995; Dugger, 1990). Thus, 
further research, both theoretical and empirical, needs to be done on how nonprofit 
organisation can be explained as a response to (or an expression of) the pervasive 
relations of power and coercion in modern societies. Yet another aspect of this critical 
attitude  is  involved  in  identifying  disserviceable  and  purely  ceremonial  aspects  of 
institutional    structure  and  attributing  them  to  specific  instances  of  nonprofit 
organisation with respect to those. In overall terms, further theoretical and empirical 
research  is  required  on  how  nonprofit  organisation  contributes  to  the  historical, 
evolutionary, and holistic process of societal self-provisioning with material means of   17 
 
 
life. To repeat, this research would present a clear and useful alternative to exploring 
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